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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK : IAS PART 12

- --------------------------------------------------------------------x
[11 the Matter of the Application of

Index no. 100407/16

E(ARENELY,
Petitioner,

Por a Judgment Under Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules,

Motion seq. no. 001

ORDER & JUDGMENT

-against-

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PARO LE,
Respondent.

----·----------------------------------------------------------------x
BARBARA JAFFE, JSC:
For petitioner:
Brett Dignan1, Esq.
Hannah Canham, Esq.
Columbia University School of Law
Morningside Heights Legal Servs., Inc.
435 West I 16'h St., Rm. 831
New York, NY 10027
212-854-4291

For respondent:
Eric T. Schneiderman, NYS Atty General
Kristen Vogel, AAG
120 Broadway, 24'h fl.
New York, NY 10271
212-416-8606

Petitioner, presently incarcerated, moves pursuant to CPLR Article 78 for an order
vacating respondent's denial of her application for release on parole, and ordering a new hearing.
Respondent opposes.
I. PERTINENT BACKGROUND

On February 10, 1983, petitioner was found guilty by a jmy of second-degree murder.
On appeal, she was granted a new trial, after which she was again found guilty by a jury of
second-degree murder. (Verified Answer [Ans.], Exh. 4).
The evidence against petitioner established that she was 34 years old when she solicited a
23-year-old man to murder her ex-husband, the father of her toddler son. She plarmed the murder

l:?Y luring her ex-husband to the basement of their former marital home, where petitioner's
ei-waiting accomplice strangled him with a clothesline, with petitioner's assistance. The two then
disposed of the body. (Ans.; Verified Petition [Pet.], Exh. A, at 2-3).
At each trial, petitioner claimed innocence, and at the sentencing proceeding, when asked

by the trial court if she wanted to be heard, petitioner reiterated her claim of innocence. After
describing petitioner's crime as "a cold, calculated, planned action to get what [petitioner]
wanted for her own betterment because she had a boyfriend sitting in jail, because she had told
that boyfriend that her son was his and she wanted the best of all possible worlds and be damned
with [her ex-husband]," the trial court sentenced petitioner to an indeterminate term of
imprisonment of25 years to life, recommended that she never be granted parole, and stated that,
if he could, he would have imposed a maximum sentence of250 years to life. (Ans., Exh. 3, at 910).
Petitioner appeared before respondent Board in 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013. Article 78
proceedings, brought in connection with the latter two denials, were dismissed. (Ans.).
II. PETITIONER'S JUNE 2015 PAROLE BOARD INTERVIEW
The record reflects that at the most recent interview, held on June 2, 2015, respondent had
before it the 67-year-old petitioner's statement, remorse letter, self-assessment, pre-sentence
investigation report, OMH status report, COMP AS report, reports on her programs, vocations,
her program certificates, and letters of support. The interview commenced with questions put to
petitioner about the crime and her relationships with the victim, her accomplice, and her son. In
response to an inquiry as to why she solicited her accomplice to murder her ex-husband,
petitioner stated that she and her son were battered and abused by her ex-husband, evidence of
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..which was presented at her trial as to her motive to commit the crime and which both the jury
@lld sentencing judge rejected. She stated that during the course of her marriage, she had
changed the locks on her home and had an order of protection based on her neighbor's statement
claiming that her ex-husband had knocked her then-toddler son down the. steps of her house. She
a-lso once left the state due to her fear of her ex-husband. Petitioner recounted how in 1979, she

h.ad her ex-husband atTested, but the charges were dis~ssed by the police, even though,

'

following a visitation, her ex-husband returned her son, bruised, to her. (Pet., Exh. A, at 3-4). In
response to her presentation, one of the commissioners confronted petitioner with a "different
picture" arising from information in the file, specifically other alleged bad acts, such as her
alleged manipulation of family members in the past for financial gain, reflecting that she is
"manipulative and cunning." (Id at 5).
Petitioner then answered questions about how she recruited her accomplice, and in
response to a commissioner's assertion that her arrest and conviction were her sole arrest and
conviction, she advised that she had been arrested for arson, but that the charge had been
.dismissed. She was then pressed on the events leading to that arrest. (Id at 7).
In response to a question about the many programs in which she had participated,
petitioner stated that she was proud to have helped initiate a domestic violence awareness
program at the prison, whereby she conveyed to other victims of domestic abuse that her own
method of handling her domestic violence probkm did not resolve it, but caused far more
problems and pain for all. She was also gratified to have been appointed to positions of trust
such as computer programming and serving as secretary to the prison superintendent, and to
having created a legal database of materials to assist. her fellow inmates in understanding how to
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s;:erve their time and be released as employable. (Id at 8-11 ).
When asked about her plan for release, petitioner advised that she had been offered work
t:S-S

a paralegal at a Manhattan law firm, which also offered to pay for law school, and that she

i~tended

to relocate to "the city" and avoid places where she might cause others pain. (Id. at 11-

1 2).
A connnissioner then asked petitioner if she had been offered a plea bargain before her
tdal. She replied that she had rejected an offer of 22 years to life as she did not understand that
sbe could get more time after trial. Another question ensued about her accomplice and why she
chose him. Petitioner explained that her accomplice "hated" her ex-husband, that the two had
been in physical altercations, that her accomplice had offered to murder her ex-husband, and that
while she had initially demurred, that "all [she] could think of was that [she] was never going to
be hit again and [her] son was going to be safe." (Id. at 13).
Although respondent aclmowledged that petitioner's COMP AS Risk and Needs
Assessment was positive "across the board," and that she was assigned the lowest possible risk
for felony violence, re-arrest, and absconding, questioning resumed about the crime, with an
inquiry into petitioner's role in the murder. Petitioner explained how some two years after her
separation from l;ier ex-husband and shortly after their divorce, at her ex-husband's request, she
. had arranged for her accomplice to assist him in retrieving his belongings from her home, but
that her accomplice had solely connnitted the murderous act in her presence. (Id. at 13-14).
Petitioner's educational background was the next topic of discussion. She has a
bachelor's degree in teaching English and Spanish and had obtained credits toward a doctorate.
She attended the University of Barcelona, Oneonta State Teacher's College, and the state
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0lllversity (SUNY) at Albany. Among her prior jobs, she worked as a .school teacher, nurse's
eilde, and various summer jobs while in college. Petitioner stopped teaching when her mother
'"'was dying of cancer." She had also owned a delicatessen and had spent her entire life in
Rensselaer, New York. (Id at 16).
Another commissioner then asked petitioner why, given the rancor between her exh.usband and her accomplice, her ex-husband would seek her accomplice's assistance in
retrieving his belongings. Petitioner explained thatthe accomplice regularly performed odd jobs
for her ex-husband, notwithstanding their sporadic acrimony. She was next asked why, given the
two-year separation from her ex-husband, he had not retrieved his belongings earlier. Petitioner
responded that having moved into an apartment, her ex-husband likely had no need for his
snowblower, snow tires, and other heavy equipment, and that he had most of his other property,
which on prior occasions, she would leave on her porch for him to take, her goal being to
minimize their contact, especially as he had threatened to taice her son away to Lebanon. (Id at

16-19).
When asked about her accomplice's sentence, petitioner reported that it was 17years to
· life on a plea of guilty, which the prosecution had offered in exchange for testifying against her.
After responding to a question about the origin of the acrimonious relationship between her exhusband and her accomplice, petitioner responded to an inquiry about how she and her exhusband met. (Id at 19-2!).
Query then resumed about the crime, and that before that night, her ex-husband had not
been at the house for several months. Petitioner was also asked about the nature of the bruises
she had found on her son and why she believed that they were not accidentally caused. Petitioner
replied that some of the bruises were around his mouth and nose, that her son had told her that
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t:ier ex-husband had hit him, and that bruises on his arms appeared to be fingermarks. Petitioner
e;::xplained that absent corroboration and notwithstanding a psychiatrists's findings, the charges
y<.Tere dismissed. (Id at 21-23).
In response to a question about how she chose to transport her ex-husband's body, she
s-tated that, without her assistance, her accomplice drove the body to Albany. She also denied
)Laving had any physical contact with her ex-husband dming the attack. Rather, she was panicked
a:nd "almost fell apart right then and there." (Id at 27).
Immediately following the interview, respondent issued its decision, summarizing
petitioner's crime as follows:
[Y]ou solicited a young alcoholic handyman to aid you in your ambush mmder of your
ex-husband by strangling him in your basement in a carefully orchestrated crime scene
having lights out and the washing machine running to avoid discovery of yom codefendant as you helped restrain the victim as he was strangled.

(Id. at 27).
Respondent rejected petitioner's claim that she was an "abused spouse," finding that it
was "sharply contradicted" by her "cmrning planning" of the crime. It thus concluded that, upon
review of the record and interview, and consideration of all of the statutorily required factors, her

COMPAS Assessment, rehabilitative efforts, parole plan, letters of support, age, medical status,
clean disciplinary record, and remorse, and upon deliberation, if released, it was reasonably
probable that petitioner "would not live and remain at liberty without again violating the law"
and that her "release would be incompatible" with society's welfare and "would so deprecate the
serious natme of her crime as to undermine respect for the law." (Id).
On November 20, 2015, respondent's Appeals Unit affirmed the decision. (Id, Exh. G).
Petitioner now challenges the June 2015 determination on the grounds that(!) respondent failed
to consider meaningfully the factors mandated in Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A) and properly.
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µtilize the COMPAS risk assessment, (2) attributed too much weight to the seriousness of the
crime, thereby arbitrarily and capriciously denying her release, (3) imperrnissibly relied on the
commissioners' erroneous personal beliefs about domestic violence, (4) impe1missibly relied on
onsubstantiated, inaccurate information to which petitioner was unable to respond, ( 5) failed to
provide a detailed, non-conclusory written decision denying release, and (6) impermissibly relied
~n erroneous

info1mation regarding petitioner's record. (Pet.).

Following oral argument on the petition, respondent provided the court with confidential
p :re-sentencing documents and a victim impact statement for in camera inspection.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Contentions
1. The petition
Petitioner argues that respondent relied on the circumstances surrounding her offense
almost to the complete exclusion of the other applicable statutory factors, which were referenced
fleetingly, conclusorily, or not at all. She observes that nothing in the transcript or respondent's
written decision reflects a review of her voluminous submissions. There is no mention of her
employment history or the 20 letters supporting her release which, she maintains, the
commissioners apparently had not read, having asked for tliem during her interview even tliough
they had been submitted in advance. Petitioner points at the lack of detail in respondent's
decision and its cursory, superficial reference to mitigating factors absent any analysis which, she
contends, "falls short of a lawful written determination," in contrast to respondent's detailed
attention to her crime, which was the subject of more than 50 questions during her interview,
whereas only seven of the questions related to other factors. Thus, petitioner contends,
respondent's exclusive reliance on her crime was unjustified, -it failed to show any aggravating or
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egregious circumstances related thereto or the offense renders her a present danger to society.
Given her COMPAS Assessment, she asserts that there is no basis for respondent's conclusion
t1iai she showed a high probability of recidivism. Rather, she asserts, respondent's conclusion
· V"f8S

inational, and that it could not have actually considered it. (Pet.; Memorandum of Law in

Support of Petition [Pet. Mem. of Law]).
Petitioner also claims that the commissioners were dismissive of her evidence of
cLomestic abuse, basing their decision on their personal views on the subject and their mistaken
b e1iefthat the jury had heard and rejected her claim of domestic abuse, as no such affirmative
defense was asse1ted. She maintains that the finding that she was "safely away" from her exhusband solely by virtue of their divorce is irrational and contradicted by the record, and that the
conclusion that the evidence of premeditation undermines her claim of domestic abuse is based
on outdated assumptions. (Mem. of Law).
Additionally, the so-called "community opposition" to her release, as referenced by
respondent, petitioner claims, is vague and inappropriate absent an explanation why or how it
was weighed in favor of preventing her release, or an opportunity for her to respond to it. To the
extent that the commissioners relied on statements from the press or others not authorized by the
statute, such as the accusation that she manipulated others for financial gain, she argues, that too
· is improper. (Id).
2. Respondent's answer
In its answer, respondent asserts that it acknowledged and asked petitioner about all of the
relevant factors during her interview, and that its failure to reference every factor in its written
decision does not wanant relief. It maintains that the written decision was otherwise sufficiently
detailed when read in conjunction with the transcript, and that petitioner's dissatisfaction with
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t;:be weight assigned to each factor does not constitute a ground for disturbing its determination.
rv1oreover, it argues, petitioner's assignment of more weight to mitigating factors does not render
i-ts decision inational, and a denial of release despite a favorable COMP AS Assessment does not
i:inply that the commissioners did hot consider it. While the Assessment must be considered, it
e-oatends, it ca:tTies no extra weight. (Ans.).
Respondent also denies having relied exclusively on the seriousness of petitioner's crime,
as it also cited the sentencing minutes and community opposition, and to the extent that
petitioner relies on her own mitigating evidence, it is contradicted in the record and its
assignment of comparatively more weight to the seriousness of her crime, is not improper. It also
denies that it must demonstrate aggravating circumstances beyond the seriousness of the crime
itself. (Id).
In addressing petitioner's claim of domestic abuse, whether it was raised and rejected at
her tr'ial does not, in respondent's view, suggest that its members hold personal views on the
subject that would color its analysis, and it denies having improperly relied on particular
information, observing that any information unlmown to petitioner was gleaned from her
confidential pre-sentencing report and victim impact statement, which it is not obliged to
disclose. (Id).
3. Petitioner's reply
In reply, petitioner (lrgues that respondent's mere acknowledgment ofrelevant factors,
such as her COMPAS Assessment, does not constitute meaningful consideration, and that in any
event, the commissioners only skimmed the table of contents of her parole packet. Far from
relying solely on her own self-evaluation, as respondent suggests, she daims that she offered
letters from others such as prison personnel who confirmed her suitability for parole. Thus,
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respondent paid little consideration to mitigating factors. (Reply Memorandum of Law in
Support of Petition).
Petitioner also asserts that respondent's position, that it runs afoul of the statute only if it
:f..:3-ils to mention all of the statutory factors, misstates the law in this department, and that in any
e -vent, some of the fuctors it claims to have considered were not mentioned during her interview
or in the decision, and to the extent relied upon, they are far outweighed by her evidence of
rehabilitation. She reiterates that respondent's written decision is inadequate, notwithstanding
what transpired during her interview. (Id).
Petitioner contends that her claims of abuse by her ex-husband were not supported solely
by a self-serving "portrayal" of the facts, but were independently conoborated. To the extent that
fue commissioners relied on pre-sentencing documents, she disputes that they are exempt from
disclosme, and that she should be afforded an opportunity to review and respond to them,
observing that it was c.onceded by respondents that it considered "community opposition," but
cites no authority for such a consideration. (Id).
B. Analysis

It is well-settled that in challenging a decision of the Board of Parole, the petitioner bears
the burden of showing that the decision is "the result of 'irrationality bordering on impropriety,'"
and is thus arbitrruy and capricious. (Matter ofRossakis v New York State Bd. ofParole, 41
NYS3d 490, 493, 2016 NY Slip Op 07415 [1'' Dept 2016], quoting Matter ofSilmon v Travis, 95
NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter ofRusso v New York State Bd ofParole, 50 NY2d 69, 77
[1980]). In reaching its decision on whether an inmate should be released, the Board may not
grant release "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while
confined," but must consider whether there is a reasonable chance that, upon release, the
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petitioner "will live and remain at libe1iy without violating the law," and that release is "not
i~compatible

with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of [the

P'e1itioner's] crime as to undermine respect for the law." (Executive Law§ 259-i[2][c][A];

]v:[atter a/Walker vTravis, 252 AD2d 360, 361-362 [1" Dept 1998]).
The Board must consider the eight statutory factors set forth in Executive Law
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A), including, as pertinent here, the inmate's institutional record, her release plans,
victim impact statements, the "seriousness of the offense," the nature and length of the sentence,
the pre-sentence probation report, any mitigating or aggravating factors, and the inmate's prior
criminal record. While the Board need not give each factor equal weight (Matter ofRossakis, 41
NYS3d at 494, citing Matter ofKingv New York State Div. ofParole, 190 AD2d 423, 431 [1"
Dept 1993], ajfd on other grounds 83 NY2d 788 [1994]), nor expressly discuss each statutory
factor in its dete1mination (Matter ofKing, 83 NY2d at 791 ),
[t]he role of the Parole Board is not to resentence [the inmate] according to the personal
opinions of its members as to the appropriate penalty for murder, but to determine
whether, as of this moment, given all the relevant statutory factors, he should be released.
In that regard, the statute expressly mandates that the prisoner's educational and other
achievements affirmatively be taken into consideration in determining whether he meets
the general criteria relevant to parole release.

(Matter ofRossakis, 41 NYS3d at 494, quoting Matter a/King, 190 AD2d at 432).
Thus, the denial of release on parole may not be based solely on the seriousness of the
crime (Matter ofRossakis, 41 NYS3d at 494, citing eg Matter ofRamirez v Evans, 118 AD3d
707 [2d Dept 2014]), and the Board is deemed to have relied exclusively on the crime when it
mentions, but does not meaningfully consider, the other factors on which it purportedly based its
decision (Matter ofKing, 190 AD2d at 433-434). In determining whether the Board has satisfied
the statutory criteria, its written decision must be evaluated in the context of the entire
proceeding, including the petitioner's parole hearing (Matter ofJackson v Evans, 118 AD3d 701,
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'102 [2d Dept 2014]), but the Board may not summarily itemize a petitioner's achievements while
i:11-carcerated or render a conclusory decision pan-oting the statutory standard (Matter of Rossakis,
4-1 NYS3d at 494-495). The petitioner nonetheless bears a "heavy burden" in demonstrating that
tbe Board did not properly consider all relevant factors. (Matter ofPhillips v Dennison, 41 AD3d
1 7, 21 [1'' Dept 2007], lv dismissed 9 NY3d 956; see People ex rel. Herbert v New York State

gd. ofParole, 97 AD2d 128, 133[l"Dept1983]).
The Board must consider the inmate's COMP AS Assessment, which is based on her
"criminal record, disciplinary history, support network, use of illegal substances, and readiness
for employment." (Matter a/Symes v New York State Ed a/Parole, 117 AD3d 959, 959 [2d
Dept 2014]; see also Executive Law§ 259-c[4]). Like the other statutory factors, the Assessment
is "only one factor that the Board [is] required to consider" when determining the petitioner's
application for release on parole. (Matter a/Crawford v New York State Ed. ofParole, 144 AD3d
1308, 2016 NY Slip Op 07389, *l [3d Dept 2016]).
And yet, in Rossakis, the First Department indicated that absent a "supported finding" of
a likelihood ofre-offending, the Board's disregard of the petitioner's "impressive" COMP AS
Assessment was arbitrary and capricious (41 NYS3d at 495), reflecting what appears to be an
increasing emphasis on rehabilitation in the determination as to whether an inmate should be
released on parole. (See eg Eli Rosenberg, Cuomo Commutes Sentence ofJudith Clark, Driver in

Deadly Brink's Robbery, NY Times, Dec. 30, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/30/ny
region/cuomo-commutes-sentence-of-judith-clark-driver-in-deadly-brinks-robbery.html [last
accessed Jan. 20, 2017] [citing Clark's "exceptional strides in self-development," Governor
Cuomo commuted Clark's sentence, making her eligible for parole in 2017]). In fact, a proposal
has been recently advanced that would require the Board to support a departure from a positive
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COMPAS Assessment with an "individualized reason." (NY Reg, Sept. 28, 2016 at 7 ["If a
Board detennination, denying release, departs from the COMP AS scores, an individualized
reason for such departure shall be given in the decision"]; Joel Stashenko, Parole Reform Groups

:;ay Proposed New Rules Don't Go Far Enough, NYLJ, Dec. 13, 2016, http://www.newyorklaw
journal. com/id= 120277459453 l/Parole-Reform-Groups-Say-%20Proposed-%20New"Rules-

Dm 't-Go-Far-Enough [accessed on Jan. 17, 2017]).
The Court in Rossakis also found that the Board had disregarded the petitioner's
acceptance of responsibility for the crime and expression of remorse, and failed to consider "that
petitioner may legitimately view herself as a battered woman,'' in light of advances recently
m.ad.e in understanding domestic violence and notwithstanding that her defenses based thereon
were rejected by the jury. It held that the Board's exclusive focus on the seriousness of the
petitioner's crime and the victim impact statements, which were mischaracterized by the Board
as "community opposition to her release," "without giving genuine consideration to petitioner's
remorse, institutional achievements, release plan, and her lack of any prior violent history,"
constituted "irrationality bordering on impropriety." (Id at 494).
Here too, respondent's decision is brief and conclusory, with some 80 percent of her
interview and.most of the written decision addressed to the crime, petitioner's accomplice, and
the victim, giving, at most, superficial consideration to the other pertinent factors, including
petitioner's good conduct, her achievements while incarcerated, her sincere efforts toward
rehabilitation, and her COMP AS Assessment reflecting a virtually nonexistent risk of recidivism.

(See id at 494). While respondent may assign as much weight as it deems necessary to the
seriousness of petitioner's crime, its decision nevertheless reflects a marked disinclination to
consider her achievements and other mitigating factors or explain how or why they are
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outweighed by the severity of her crime. (See id at 495 ["The Board summarily listed
petitioner's institutional achievements, and then denied parole with no further analysis .... "]).
Respondent's contention that due consideration was given these factors during
petitioner's interview is not supported by the record, which reflects that few meaningful
questions were asked and little analysis given to her mitigating evidence beyond the conclusory
finding that it was "contradicted" by the seriousness of the crime. (See Matter ofKing, 190 AD2d
at: 433-434 [while Board mentioned factors favoring release, only mentioned "to dismiss them in
light of the fact that a police officer had been killed"]; cf Matter ofSilmon v Travis, 95 NY2d
470, 478 [2000] [Board properly evaluated petitioner's "rehabilitative progress to determine ifhe
still posed a danger, and in that connection properly considered remorse and insight into the
criminal act"]). Although respondent was not required to expressly discuss all of the factors
favoring petitioner's release, the record here reflects only sparse and superficial consideration
"bordering on" no consideration at all. (See Matter ofKing, 190 AD2d at 434).
While petitioner planned the murder and manipulated her troubled young accomplice to
assist her, the proven instances of domestic violence committed by her ex-husband, as in

Rossakis, preclude a wholesale rejection of her claim that she and her sori were abused by her exhusband, and the impact of such evidence in the 1980s has no bearing on its impact today

(Matter ofRossakis, 41 NYS2d at 494-495 [that jury rejected battered spouse defense did not
preclude finding that petitioner "legitimately viewed herself as a battered woman," particulm'ly
· given that "collective understanding of domestic violence is far greater today than when
petitioner was arrested and tried"]). In any event, there is no way of knowing whether the jury
discredited her evidence that her ex-husband abused her and her son, as an affirmative defense
based thereon was not yet recognized.
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Respondent's inquiries into petitioner's character, however, were properly based on the

pre-sentencing report and victim jmpact statement. (Cf Matter ofKing, 83 NY2d at 791
[yetitioner not afforded proper bearing where Board considered factors, such as penal
.

~hilosophy,

.

not authorized under Executive Law§ 259-i]). While that evidence informed

respondent's opinion ofpetitioner, it does not obviate its duty to consider all other factors in a
meaningful manner.

IV. CONCLUSION
Petitioner's COMPAS Assessment, lack of a prior criminal record,.age, infirmity,' lengthy
irnprisoiunent to date, clear exp~ssion of re~orse, a.cceptance o.fresponsibility for her crime,
post-release plans, the many letters submitted by corrections professionals in support of her

release, and the many positive initiatives she undertook during her incarceration, indicate that

r~spondent's denial of release was more in the nature of a re-sentencing, and th~t no amowit of
evidence of rehabilitation would have outweighed its interest in retribution.
- -For all the foregoing reasons, I .find that petitioner satisfies her burden of proving that
respondent's determination is the result of"irrationality bordering on impropriety," and thus is
arbitrary and capricious, and accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED a11d ADJUDGED, that the petition is granted, respondent's June 2015
.

.

.

determination is vacated, and the matter is remanded to respondent for a.de novo hi:~ari ng/
interview to take place within 30 days of this order andjudgment before a board of
commissioners who did not sit on petitioner's June 2, 2015 parole hearing.

ENTER:

DATED:

January 20, 2017
New York, New York
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